Real Property

Real Property

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Exams Listed at the end of the syllabus infra.


Students will learn the fundamental legal principles involved in the acquisition, sale, and transfer of real property.


  • Text - Complete textbook reading assignments
  • Audio - Listen to audio lectures
  • Study Record - Return monthly study record by mail
  • On-Line Questions - Take on-line testing to prove competency


  • Faculty assessment of midterm examination. Answer 25 multiple-choice questions on-line and submit 2 essay questions for grading. Resubmitting essays can raise midterm grades. Essays will be graded and returned in 7-10 working days depending on each professor’s schedule.
  • Faculty assessment of final examination. Answer 50 multiple-choice questions on-line and submit 4 essays questions for grading. Essays will be graded and returned in 7-10 working days depending on each professor’s schedule. Forty percent (40%) of final grade will be determined by number and quality of briefs submitted with monthly reports.

Required Materials:

Property; 4th Edition; Jesse Dukeminier, Professor and James E. Krier, Trustee; Published January 30, 1998 Aspen Publishers, Inc.; ISBN: 1567066488

Supplemental Material:
“Nailing the Bar, A Guide to Essays” by Tim Tyler, America’s Legal & Professional Bookstores Publishing, ISBN# 1-879563-49-5

Law School Legends: Real Property; Professor Paula A. Franzese; ISBN: 0159002893




Week #1-2

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 1 “Introduction” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 
Audio Listen to “Real Property” Audio Tapes by Paula A. Franzese (no notes) 


Week #3-4

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 2 “Character of Property” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


End of Week #4

Study Record Study Record Due (include Roadmap Assignments)


Week #5-6

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 3 “Fee Tails & Fee Absolute” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


Week #7-8

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 4 “Life Estates and Reversions & Remainders” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier


End of Week #8

Study Record Study Record Due (include Roadmap Assignments)


Week #9-10

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 5 “Future Interests” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


Week #11-12

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 7 “Doctrine of Worthier Title” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


End of Week #12

Study Record Study Record Due (include Roadmap Assignments)


Week #13-14

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 6 “Rule in Shelley’s Case” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


Week #15-16

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 7 “Rule Against Perpetuities” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 



Study Record Study Record Due (include Roadmap Assignments)


Week #17-18

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 7 “Rule Against Perpetuities” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


Week #19-20

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 6 “Rule in Shelley’s Case” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


End of Week #20

Study Record Study Record Due (include Roadmap Assignments)


Week #21-22

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 8 “Nuisance” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


Week #23-24

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 8 “Waste” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier


End of Week #24

Study Record Study Record Due (include Roadmap Assignments)


Week #25-26

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 8 “Community Property” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


Week #27-28

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 8 “Marital Estates” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


End of Week #28

Study Record Study Record Due (include Roadmap Assignments)


Week #29-30

Material Subject
Audio Listen to “Real Property” Audio Tapes by Paula A. Franzese (no notes) 


Week #31-32

Material Subject
Audio Listen to “Real Property” Audio Tapes by Paula A. Franzese (taking notes) 



Study Record Study Record Due (include Roadmap Assignments)


Week #33-34

Material Subject
Review Review Chapter 1 “Introduction” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 
Review Review Chapter 2 “Character of Property” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


Week #35-36

Material Subject
All Review Material for Midterm Exam 


End of Week #36

Study Record Study Record Due


Week #37-38

Material Subject
All Review Material for Midterm Exam 


Answer and submit the Midterm Examination Questions listed infra.


Week #39-40

Material Subject
Review Review Chapter 3 “Fee Tails & Fee Absolute” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 
Review Review Chapter 4 “Life Estates and Reversions & Remainders” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 
Review Read Chapter 5 “Future Interests” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


End of Week #40

Study Record Study Record Due (include any Roadmap Assignments)


Week #41-42

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 9 “Landlord Tenant” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


Week #43-44

Material Subject
Text Read Chapter 10 “Equitable Servitudes” from “Property, Fourth Edition” by Dukeminier 


End of Week #44

Study Record Study Record Due (include any Roadmap Assignments)


Week #45-46

Material Subject
All Review Material for Final Exam 
Audio Listen to “Real Property” Audio Tapes by Paula A. Franzese (take notes as necessary with focus on final exam) 


Week #47-48

Material Subject
All Review Material for Final Exam 


Answer and submit the Final Examination Questions listed infra.






Essay Examination Instructions
Your answer should demonstrate your ability to analyze the facts in the question, to tell the difference between material facts and immaterial facts, and to discern the points of law and fact upon which the case turns. Your answer should show that you know and understand the pertinent principles and theories of law, their qualifications and limitations, and their relationships to each other.

Your answer should evidence your ability to apply the law to the given facts and to reason in a logical, lawyer-like manner from the premises you adopt to a sound conclusion. Do not merely show that you remember legal principles. Instead, try to demonstrate your proficiency in using and applying them.

If your answer contains only a statement of your conclusions, you will receive little credit. State fully the reasons that support your conclusions, and discuss all points thoroughly.

Your answer should be complete, but you should not volunteer information or discuss legal doctrines that are not pertinent to the solution of the problem.

Unless a question expressly asks you to use California law, you should answer according to legal theories and principles of general application.



Real Property Question 1

Sam and Paul entered into a written contract on September 1, 1999, for the sale by Sam to Paul of a mountain lakefront lot improved with a residence (the “parcel”) for $100,000. The contract was silent as to the quality of title Sam would convey, but provided that a quitclaim deed would be used. Paul failed to tender the agreed-on price on the performance date. Sam sued Paul for specific performance on July 5, 2000. Paul defended the suit on the ground that Sam’s title is not marketable.

Sam’s claim of title goes back to Owen, who owned an unencumbered fee simple absolute in the parcel. The parcel, which was accessible only during the summer months, had been occupied by Owen and Owen’s family as a summer vacation home since 1980. In 1984, Owen conveyed the parcel by recorded deed to “my daughter, Doris, and my son, George, so long as they both shall live, and then to the survivor of them.”

Owen died testate in 1987. Owen’s will made no specific reference to the parcel, but the residuary clause left to Doris “all my other property not specifically disposed of by this will.” Doris and George and their families continued to use the vacation home each summer. Doris died testate in April 1988, her will “devising and bequeathing all my estate to my son, Ed.”

George executed a deed in May 1988, purporting to convey a fee simple absolute in the parcel to Cain. Cain and his family occupied the parcel during the summers of 1988 through 1996. In May 1997, Cain conveyed the parcel to Sam. Sam’s family occupied it during the summers of 1997 through 1999.

The statute of limitations on actions to recover land in this jurisdiction is 10 years. There is no statute or decision by an appellate court either repudiating or affirming the common law doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders.

Who should prevail in Sam’s suit against Paul? Discuss.  





Real Property Question 1

Artist owns a workshop in a condominium building consisting of the workshops and sales counters of sculptors, painters, potters, weavers, and other craftspeople. The covenants, conditions and regulations (CC&Rs) of the building provide for a board of managers (Board), which has authority to make "necessary and appropriate rules." Board long ago established a rule against the sale within the building of items not created within the sellers' workshops.

Artist accepted a three-year fellowship in Europe and leased the workshop to Weaver for that period. The lease prohibited an assignment of Weaver's rights. Weaver used the workshop to produce custom textiles.

A year into the term, Weaver transferred her right of occupancy to Sculptor for one year. Sculptor moved into the workshop with his cot, electric hotplate, and clothes. He also brought several works of art that he had created during a stay in South America and offered them for sale along with his current works. Sculptor mailed his rent checks every month to Artist, who accepted them. Both Weaver and Sculptor knew the terms of the CC&Rs and Board's rules when they acquired their interests in the workshop.

Three months after Sculptor moved in, Board told Sculptor to stop selling his South American pieces. He refused to do so and thereafter withheld his rent and complained that the regulation was unreasonable and that the building's heating was erratic.

1. What action, if any, may Board take against Artist to enforce the rule against the sale of Sculptor's South American pieces? Discuss.
2. Can Artist recover from Weaver the rent that Sculptor has refused to pay? Discuss.
3. Can Artist evict Sculptor from his occupancy? Discuss.


Real Property Question 2

Since the early 1960s, Artist has had a year-to-year lease of the third floor of a small loft building which, like most buildings in the area, has mixed commercial and light manufacturing uses. Artist has used her space, as other local craftspeople have used theirs, for both residential and studio purposes. She has enjoyed the serenity other unit and the panoramic views of the distant hills and of the nearby park to which she has had easy access.

In July 1998, Landlord rented a lower floor of the building to Machinist, whose operations are extremely noisy. Artist's complaints about the noise to both Machinist and Landlord have been to no avail.

At about the same time, Developer began building a large office tower nearby which will block Artist's view when completed. The office building will provide needed employment for the community.

The State Power Department, a State governmental agency, has also begun construction of electric and communications lines for Developer's office building. For the next several years the State Power Department construction will block a path across an undeveloped lot, which separates Artist's neighborhood from the park. Artist and other neighborhood residents have regularly used the path for many years because the only other access to the park is by a much longer circuitous street route.

1. What are Artist's rights and remedies, if any, against Landlord, Machinist and Developer? Discuss.
2. What are Artist's rights and remedies, if any, against the State Power Department for blocking the path? Discuss.



2nd Year Mulitstate method MBE

Multiple Choice Questions Midterm & Final



Midterm: #1 - 15
Final: #16 - 37


Midterm: #None
Final: #1 - 15


Questions 1-3 are based on the following fact situation

Sue owned a five-acre tract of land, one acre of which had previously been owned by Opal, but to which Sue had acquired title by adverse possession. Sue contracted to convey the full five-acre tract to Peg, but the contract did not specify the quality of title Sue would convey. At closing, Peg refused the tendered deed and demanded return of her earnest money.


Question 1

Suppose Peg pays the purchase price and accepted a deed. Subsequently, Sue's title to the one acre proves inadequate and Opal ejects Peg from that acre. Peg sues Sue for damages. Which of the following statements applies most accurately to the determination of Peg's rights?

A. Sue's deed was fraudulent
B. The terms of the deed control Sue's liability
C. The only remedy available for breach of warranty of title is rescission
D. Peg's rights are based on the implied covenant that the title conveyed shall be marketable


Question 2

Suppose Sue's contract had called for the conveyance of "a good and marketable title." Pursuant to that contract, Peg paid the purchase price and accepted a deed from Sue containing no covenants of title. Sue's title to the one acre subsequently proved defective and Peg was ejected by Opal. Peg sued Sue. Which of the following results is most likely?

A. Peg will win because Sue's deed was fraudulent
B. Peg will win because the terms of the deed control Sue's liability
C. Sue will win because the terms of the deed control her liability
D. Sue will win because the deed incorporates the terms of the contract  


Question 3

Suppose that before closing, the house on the property had been totally destroyed by fire. In determining the rights of Sue and Peg, the court would most likely consider the doctrine of equitable 

A. Marshaling
B. Sequestration
C. Subrogation
D. Conversion


Question 4

Owens contracted to sell a tract of land, Overlea, to Painter by general warranty deed. However, at the closing Painter did not carefully examine the deed and accepted a quitclaim deed without covenants of title. Painter later attempted to sell Overlea to Thompson, who refused to perform because Owens had conveyed an easement for a highway across Overlea before Painter bought the property.

Painter sued Owens for damages. Which of the following arguments will most likely succeed in Owens' defense?

A. The existence of the easement does not violate the contract.
B. The mere existence of an easement that is not being used does not give rise to a cause of action.
C. Painter's cause of action must be based on the deed and not on the contract.
D. The proper remedy is rescission of the deed.


Question 5

Lord leased a warehouse building and the lot on which It stood to Taylor for a term of ten years. The lease contained a clause prohibiting Taylor from subletting his interest.

Can Taylor assign his interest under the lease? '

A. Yes, because restraints on alienation of land are strictly construed.
B. Yes, because disabling restraints on alienation of land are invalid.
C. No, because the term "subletting" includes "assignment when the term is employed in a lease.
D. No, because even in the absence of an express prohibition on assignment, a tenant may not assign without the landlord's permission.  


Questions 6-7 are based on the following fact situation

Oscar, the owner in fee simple, laid out a subdivision of 325 lots on 150 acres of land. He obtained governmental approval (as required by applicable ordinances) and, between 1968 and 1970, he sold 140 of the lots, inserting in each of the 140 deeds the following provision:

"The Grantee, for himself and his heirs, assigns and successors, covenants and agrees that the premises conveyed herein shall have erected thereon one single family dwelling and that no other structure (other than a detached garage, normally incident to a single-family dwelling) shall be erected or maintained; and, further, that no use shall ever be made or permitted to be made than occupancy by a single family for residential purposes only."

Because of difficulty encountered in selling the remaining lots for single family use, in January 1971, Oscar advertised the remaining lots with prominent emphasis: "These lots are not subject to any restrictions and purchasers will find them adaptable to a wide range of uses."


Question 6

Payne had purchased one of the 140 lots and brought suit against Oscarto establish that the remaining 185 lots, as well as the 140 sold previously, can be used only for residential purposes by single families. Assuming that procedural requirements have been met to permit adjudication of the issue Payne has tendered, which of the following is the most appropriate comment? 

A. Oscar should win because the provision binds only the grantee.
B. The outcome turns on whether a common development scheme had been established for the entire subdivision.
C. The outcome turns on whether there are sufficient land areas devoted to multi-family uses within the municipality to afford reasonable opportunity for all economic classes to move into the area so as to satisfy the standards of equal protection of the law.
D. Payne should win under an application of the doctrine that requires construction of deeds to resolve any doubt against the grantor.


Question 7

Suppose that Oscar sold 50 lots during 1971 without inserting n the deeds any provisions relating to structures or uses. Doyle purchased one of the 50 lots and proposes to erect a service station and to conduct a retail business for the sale of gasoline, etc.

Pringle purchased a lot from Boyer. Boyer had purchased from Oscar in 1968 and the deed had the provision that is quoted in the fact situation.

Pringle brings suit to prevent Doyle from erecting the f service station and from conducting a retail business.

In the litigation between Pringle and Doyle, which of the following constitutes the best defense for Doyle?

A. Oscar's difficulty in selling with provisions relating to use establishes a change in circumstances that renders any restrictions that may once have existed unenforceable.
B. Enforcement of the restriction, in view of the change of circumstances, would be an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
C. Since the proof (as stated) does not establish a danger of monetary loss to Pringle, Pringle has failed to establish one of the necessary elements in a cause of action to prevent Doyle from using his lot for business purposes.
D. The facts do not establish a common building or development scheme for the entire subdivision.


Questions 8-10 are based on the following fact situation

Owen held in fee simple Farmdale, a large tract of vacant land. The state wherein Farmdale is situated has a statute that provides, in substance, that unless the conveyance is recorded, every deed or other conveyance of an interest in land is void as to a subsequent purchaser who pays value without notice of such conveyance. The following transactions occurred in the order given.

First: Owen conveyed Farmdale, for a fair price, to Allred by general warranty deed. Allred did not immediately record.

Second: Owen executed a mortgage to secure repayment of a loan concurrently made to Owen by Leon. Leon had no notice of the prior conveyance to Allred and promptly duly recorded the mortgage.

Third: Owen, by general warranty deed, gratuitously conveyed to Niece, who promptly duly recorded this deed.

Fourth: Allred duly recorded his deed from Owen. Fifth: Niece, by general warranty deed, conveyed Farmdale to Barrett. Barrett had no actual notice of any of the prior transactions, paid full value, and promptly duly recorded the deed.


Question 8

Asserting that his title was held free of any claim by Barrett, Allred instituted suit against Barrett to quiet title to Farmdale. If Barrett prevails, it will be because 

A. Alfred's prior recorded deed is deemed to be outside Barren's chain of title
B. Barren's grantor, Niece, recorded before Allred
C. As between two warranty deeds, the later one controls
D. Barren's grantor, Niece, had no notice of Alfred's rights


Question 9

Asserting that his title was held free of any claim by Leon, Allred instituted suit against Leon to quiet title to Farmdale. Judgment should be for

A. Allred, because Leon is deemed not to have paid value
B. Allred, because a mortgagee is not a subsequent purchaser within the meaning of the statute mentioned
C. Leon, because he recorded before Allred
D. Leon, because he advanced money without notice of Allred's rights


Question 10

Assume for this question only that Niece had not conveyed to Barren. After Allred recorded his deed from Owen, Allred, asserting that Allred's title was held free of any claim by Niece, instituted suit against Niece to recover title to Farmdale. Judgment should be for 

A. Niece, because she had no notice of Allred's rights when she accepted the deed from Owen
B. Niece, because she recorded her deed before Allred recorded his
C. Allred, because Niece was not a bona fide purchaser who paid value
D. Allred, because he had paid value for Farmdale and had no actual or constructive notice of the deed to Niece


Question 11

Assume for the purposes of these questions that you are counsel to the state legislative committee that is responsible for real estate laws in your state. The committee wants you to draft a statute governing the recording of deeds that fixes priorities of title, as reflected on the public record, as definitely as possible. Which of the following, divorced from other policy considerations, would best accomplish this particular result?

A. Eliminate the requirement of witnesses to deeds
B. Make time of recording the controlling factor
C. Make irrebuttable the declarations in the deeds that valuable consideration was paid
D. Make the protection of bona fide purchasers the controlling factor


Questions 12-13 are based on the following fact situation

Seller and Buyer execute an agreement for the sale of real property on September 1, 1971. The jurisdiction in which the property is located recognized the principle of equitable conversion and has no statute pertinent to this problem.


Question 12

Assume for this question only that Seller dies before closing and his will leaves his personal property to Perry and his real property to Rose. There being no breach of the agreement by either party, which of the following is correct? 

A. Death, an eventuality for which the parties could have provided, terminates the agreement if they did not so provide.
B. Rose is entitled to the proceeds of the sale when it closes, because the doctrine of equitable conversion does not apply to these circumstances.
C. Perry is entitled to the proceeds of the sale when it closes.
D. Title was rendered unmarketable by Seller's death.


Question 13

Assume for this question only that Buyer dies before closing, there being no breach of the agreement by either party. Which of the following is appropriate in most jurisdictions? 

A. Buyer's heir may specifically enforce the agreement.
B. Seller has (he right to return the down payment and cancel the contract.
C. Death terminates the agreement.
D. Any title acquired would be unmarketable by reason of Buyer's death.


Questions 14-15 are based on the following fact situation

Ohner holds title in fee simple to a tract of 1,500 acres. He desires to develop the entire tract as a golf course, country club, and residential subdivision. He contemplates forming a corporation to own and to operate the golf course and country club; the stock in the corporation will be distributed to the owners of lots in the residential portions of the subdivision but no obligation to issue the stock is to ripen until all the residential lots are sold. The price of the lots is intended to return enough money to compensate Ohner for the raw land, development costs (including the building of the golf course and the country club facilities), and developer's profit, if all of the lots are sold.

Ohner's market analyses indicate that he must create a scheme of development that will offer prospective purchasers (and their lawyers) a very high order of assurance that several aspects will be clearly established:

1. Aside from the country club and golf course, there will be no land user other than for residential use and occupancy in the 1,500 acres.

2. The residents of the subdivision will have unambiguous right of access to the club and golf course facilities.

3. Each lot owner must have an unambiguous right to transfer his lot to a purchaser with all original benefits.

4. Each lot owner must be obligated to pay annual dues to a pro rata share (based on the number of lots) of the club's annual operating deficit (whether or not such owner desires to make use of club and course facilities).


Question 14

In the context of all aspects of the scheme, which of the, following will offer the best chance of implementing the requirement that each lot owner pay annual dues to support the club and golf course? 

A. Covenant
B. Easement
C. Mortgage
D. Personal contractual obligation by each purchaser


Question 15

Of the following, the greatest difficulty that will be encountered in establishing the scheme is that

A. Any judicial recognition will be construed as state action which, under current doctrines, raises a substantial question whether such action would be in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment
B. The scheme, if effective, renders title unmarketable
C. One or more of the essential aspects outlined by Ohner will result in a restraint on alienation
D. There is a judicial reluctance to recognize an affirmative burden to pay money in installments and over an indefinite period as a burden which can be affixed to bind future owners of land


Question 16

Rogers gave Mitchell a power of attorney containing the following provision:

"My attorney, Mitchell, is specifically authorized to sell and convey any part or all of my real property." Mitchell conveyed part of Rogers' land to Stone by deed in the customary form containing covenants of title. Stone sues Rogers for breach of a covenant. The outcome of Stone's suit will be governed by whether

A. deeds without covenants are effective to convey realty
B. the jurisdiction views the covenants as personal or running with the land
C. Stone is a bona fide purchaser
D. The power to "sell and convey" is construed to include the power to execute the usual form of deed used to convey realty


Question 17

Alien and Barker are equal tenants in common of a strip of land 10 feet wide and 100 feet deep, which lies between the lots on which their respective homes are situated. Both Alien and Barker need the use of the 10-foot strip as a driveway, and each fears that a new neighbor might seek partition and leave him with an unusable 5-foot strip. The best advice about how to solve their problem is

A. A covenant against partition
B. An indenture granting cross easements in the undivided half interest of each
C. Partition into two separate 5-foot wide strips and an indenture granting cross easements
D. A trust to hold the strip in perpetuity


Question 18

In 1967 Owen held Blackacre, a tract of land, in fee simple absolute. In that year he executed and delivered to Price a quitclaim deed that purported to release and quitclaim to Price all of the right, title and interest of Owen in Blackacre. Price accepted the quitclaim and placed the deed in his safety deposit box.

Owen was indebted to Crider in the amount of $35,000. In September 1971, Owen executed and delivered to Crider a warranty deed, purporting to convey the fee simple to Blackacre, in exchange for a full release of the debt he owed to Crider. Crider immediately recorded his deed.

In December 1971, Price caused his quitclaim deed to Blackacre to be recorded and notified Crider that he (Price) claimed title.

Assume that there is no evidence of occupancy of Blackacre and assume, further, that the jurisdiction where Blackacre is situated has a recording statute that required good faith and value as elements of the junior claimant's priority. Which of the following is the best comment concerning the conflicting claims of Price and Crider?

A. Price cannot succeed, because the quitclaim through which he claims prevents him from being bona fide (in good faith)
B. The outcome will turn on the view taken as to whether Crider paid value within the meaning of the statute requiring this element
C. The outcome will turn on whether Price paid value (a fact not given in the statement)
D. Price's failure to record until December 1971, estops him from asserting title against Crider


Questions 19-20 are based on the following fact situation

By way of a gift, Pat executed a deed naming his daughter, Marian, as grantee. The deed contained descriptions as follows:

1. All of my land and dwelling known as 44 Main Street, Midtown, United States, being one acre.

2. All that part of my farm, being a square with 200-foot sides, the southeast corner of which is in the north line of my neighbor, Julia Brown.

The deed contained covenants of general warranty, quiet enjoyment, and right to convey.

Pat handed the deed to Marian who immediately returned it to her father for safekeeping. Her father kept it in his safe deposit box. The deed was not recorded. The property at 44 Main Street covered 7/8 of an acre of land, had a dwelling and a garage situated thereon, and was subject to a right of way, described in prior deeds, in favor of Jack, a neighbor. Pat owned no other land on Main Street. Jack had not used the right of way for ten years and it was not visible on inspection of the property.


Question 19

The description of 44 Main Street was

A. Sufficient, because the discrepancy in area is not fatal
B. Not sufficient, because it contained no metes and bounds
C. Not sufficient, because the acreage given was not correct
D. Not sufficient, because a deed purporting to convey more than a grantor owns is void ab initio


Question 20

The description of part of Pat's farm 

A. Is sufficient if consideration has been paid
B. Is sufficient because no ambiguity therein appears on the face of the deed
C. Could be enforced if the deed contained a covenant of seisin
D. Is insufficient because of vagueness


Questions 21-22 are based on the following fact situation

Owner held 500 acres in fee simple absolute. In 1960 Owner planted and obtained all required governmental approvals of two subdivisions of 200 acres each. In 1960 and 1961 commercial buildings and parking facilities were constructed on one, Royal Center, in accordance with the plans disclosed by the plat for each subdivision. Royal Center continues to be used for commercial purposes.

The plat of the other, Royal Oaks, showed 250 lots, streets, and utility and drainage easements. All of the lots in Royal Oaks were conveyed during 1960 and 1961. The deeds contained provisions, expressly stated to be binding upon the grantee, his heirs and assigns, requiring the lots to be used only for single family, residential purposes until 1985. The deeds expressly stated that these provisions were enforceable by the owner of any lot in the Royal Oaks subdivision. At all times since 1959, the 200 acres of Royal Center have been zoned for shopping center use, and the 200 acres in Royal Oaks have been zoned for residential use in a classification which permits both single-family and multiple family use.


Question 21

In an appropriate attack upon the limitation to residential user by single families, if the evidence disclosed no fact in addition to those listed above, the most probable judicial resolution would be that

A. There is no enforceable restriction because judicial recognition constitutes state action that is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
B. There is no enforceable restriction because of Owner's conflict of interest in that he did not make the restriction applicable to the 100 acres he retains
C. The restriction in user set forth in the deeds will be enforced at the suit of any present owner of a lot in Royal Oaks residential subdivision
D. Any user consistent with zoning will be permitted but that such users so permitted as are in conflict with the restrictions in the deeds will give rise to a right to damages from owner or Owner's successor


Question 22

For this question only, assume that Owner now desires to open his remaining 100 acres as a residential subdivision of 125 lots (with appropriate streets, etc.). He has, as an essential element of his scheme, the feature that the restrictions should be identical with those he planned for the original Royal Oaks residential subdivision and, further, that lot owners in Royal Oaks should be able to enforce (by lawsuits) restrictions on the lots in the 100 acres. The zoning for the 100 acres is identical with that for the 200 acres of Royal Oaks residential subdivision. Which of the following best states the chance for success for his scheme?

A. He can restrict use only to the extent of that imposed by zoning (that is, to residential user by not more than four dwelling units per lot).
B. He cannot restrict the 100 acres to residential user because of the conflicting user for retail commercial purposes in the 200 acres comprising the shopping center.
C. He cannot impose any enforceable restriction to residential user only.
D. Any chance of success depends upon the 100 acres being considered by the courts as a part of a common development scheme, which also includes the 200 acres of Royal Oaks.


Question 23

Chase, as seller, and Scott, as buyer, enter into a written contract for the sale and purchase of land, which is complete in all respects except that no reference is made to the quality of title to be conveyed. Which of the following will result?  

A. The contract will be enforceable
B. Chase will be required to convey a marketable title
C. Chase will be required to convey only what he owned on the date of the contract
D. Chase will be required to convey only what he owned on the date of the contract plus whatever additional title rights he may acquire prior to the closing date  


Questions 24-25 are based on the following fact situation

Ogden was the fee simple owner of three adjoining vacant lots fronting on a common street in a primarily residential section of a city that had no zoning laws. The lots were identified as Lots 1,2, and 3. Ogden conveyed Lot 1 to Akers and Lot 2 to Bell. Ogden retained Lot 3, which consisted of three acres of woodland. Bell, whose lot was between the other two, built a house on his lot. Bell's house included a large window on the side facing Lot 3. The window provided a beautiful view from Bell's living room, thereby adding value to Bell's house.

Akers erected a house on his lot. Ogden made no complaint to either Akers or Bell concerning the houses they built. After both Akers and Bell had completed their houses, the two of them agreed to and did build a common driveway running from the street to the rear of their respective lots. The driveway was built on the line between the two houses so that one-half of the way was located on each lot. Akers and Bell exchanged right-of-way deeds by which each of them conveyed to the other, his heirs and assigns, an easement to continue the right of way. Both deeds were properly recorded.

After Akers and Bell had lived in their respective houses for thirty years, a new public street was built bordering on the rear of Lots 1, 2, and 3. Akers informed Bell that, since the new street removed the need for their common driveway, he considered the right-of-way terminated; therefore, he intended to discontinue its use and expected Bell to do the same. At about the same time, Ogden began the erection of a six-story apartment house on Lot 3. If the apartment house is completed, it will block the view from Bell's window and will substantially reduce the value of Bell's lot.


Question 24

In an action brought by Bell to enjoin Akers from interfering with Bell's continued use of the common driveway between the two lots, the decision should be for 

A. Akers, because the termination of the necessity for the easement terminated the easement
B. Akers, because the continuation of the easement after the change of circumstances would adversely affect the marketability of both lots without adding any commensurate value to either
C. Bell, because an incorporeal hereditament lies in grant and cannot be terminated without a writing
D. Bell, because the removal of the need for the easement created by express grant does not affect the right to the easement


Question 25

In an action brought by Bell to enjoin Ogden from erecting the apartment building in such a way as to obstruct the view from Bell's living room window, the decision should be for 

A. Bell, because Ogden's proposed building would be an obstruction of Bell's natural right to an easement for light and air
B. Bell, because Bell was misled by Ogden's failure to complain when Bell was building his house
C. Ogden if, but only if, it can be shown that Ogden's intention to erect such a building was made known to Bell at or prior to the time of Ogden's conveyance to Bell
D. Ogden, because Bell has no easement for light, air, or view


Question 26

Talbot and Rogers, as lessees, signed a valid lease for a house. Lane, the landlord, duly executed the lease and delivered possession of the premises to the lessees. During the term of the lease, Rogers verbally invited Andrews to share the house with the lessees. Andrews agreed to pay part of the rent to Lane, who did not object to this arrangement, despite a provision in the lease that provided that "any assignment, subletting or transfer of any rights under this lease without the express written consent of; the landlord is strictly prohibited, null and void." Talbot objected to Andrews' moving in, even if Andrews were to pay a part of the rent. When Andrews moved in, Talbot brought an appropriate action against Lane, Rogers, and Andrews for a declaratory judgment that Rogers had no right to assign. Rogers' defense was that he and Talbot were tenants in common of a term for years, and that he, Rogers, had a right to assign a fractional interest in his undivided one half interest. In this action, Talbot will 

A. Prevail, because a co-tenant has no right to assign all or any part of a leasehold without the consent of all interested parties
B. Prevail, because the lease provision prohibits assignment
C. Not prevail, because he is not the beneficiary of the non-assignment provision in the lease
D. Not prevail, because his claim amounts to a void restraint on alienation


Question 27

The owner of Newacre executed and delivered to a power company a right-of-way deed for the building and maintenance of an overhead power line across Newacre. The deed was properly recorded. Newacre then passed through several intermediate conveyances until it was conveyed to Sloan about ten years after the date of the right-of-way deed. All the intermediate deeds were properly recorded, but none of them mentioned the right-of-way.

Sloan entered into a written contract to sell Newacre to Jones. By the terms of the contract, Sloan promised to furnish an abstract of title to Jones. Sloan contracted directly Abstract Company to prepare and deliver an abstract to Jones, | and Abstract Company did so. The abstract omitted the right-of-way deed. Jones delivered the abstract to his attorney and asked the attorney for an opinion as to title. The attorney signed and delivered to Jones a letter stating that, from the attorney's examination of the abstract, it was his "opinion that Sloan had a free and unencumbered marketable title to Newacre."

Sloan conveyed Newacre to Jones by a deed that included covenants of general warranty and against encumbrances. Jones paid the full purchase price. After Jones had been in possession of Newacre for more than a year, he learned about the right-of-way deed. Sloan, Jones, Abstract Company, and Jones' attorney were all without actual knowledge of the existence of the right-of-way to the conveyance from Sloan to Jones.

If Jones sues Sloan because of the presence of the right of-way, the most likely result will be a decision for

A. Jones, because Sloan is liable for his negligent misrepresentation
B. Jones, because the covenants in Sloan's deed to Jones have been breached
C. Sloan, because Jones relied upon Abstract Company, not Sloan, for information concerning title
D. Sloan, because Sloan was without knowledge of any defects in the title to Newacre


Question 28

At a time when Ogawa held Lot 1 in the Fairoaks subdivision in fee simple, Vine executed a warranty deed that recited that Vine conveyed Lot 1, Fairoaks, to Purvis. The deed was promptly and duly recorded. After the recording of the deed from Vine to Purvis, Ogawa conveyed Lot 1 to Vine by a warranty deed that was promptly and duly recorded. Later, Vine conveyed the property to Rand by warranty deed and the deed was promptly and duly recorded. Rand paid the fair market value of Lot 1 and had no knowledge of any claim of Purvis.

In an appropriate action, Rand and Purvis contest title to Lot 1. In this action, judgment should be for  

A. Purvis, because Purvis' deed is senior to Rand's
B. Rand, because Rand paid value without notice to Purvis' claim
C. Purvis or Rand, depending on whether a subsequent grantee is bound, at common law, by the doctrine of estoppel by deed
D. Purvis or Rand, depending on whether Purvis' deed is deemed recorded in Rand's chain of title


Question 29

Arthur and Celia, brother and sister, both of legal age, inherited Goodacre, their childhood home, from their father. They thereby became tenants in common. Goodacre had never been used as anything except a residence. Arthur had been residing on Goodacre with his father at the time his father died. Celia had been residing in a distant city. After their father's funeral, Arthur continued to live on Goodacre, but Celia returned to her own residence.

There was no discussion between Arthur and Celia concerning their common ownership, nor had there ever been any administration of their father's estate. Arthur paid all taxes, insurance, and other carrying charges on Goodacre. He paid no rent or other compensation to Celia, nor did Celia request such payment.

Thirty years later, a series of disputes arose between Arthur and Celia for the first time concerning their respective rights to Goodacre. The jurisdiction where land is located recognizes the usual common-law types of cotenancies, and there is no applicable legislation on the subject.

If Arthur claims the entire title to Goodacre in fee simple and brings an action against Celia to quiet title in himself, and if the state where the land is located has an ordinary 20-year adverse possession statute, the decision should be for  

A. Arthur, because during the past 30 years Arthur has exercised the type of occupancy ordinarily considered sufficient to satisfy the adverse possession requirements
B. Arthur, because the acts of the parties indicate Celia's intention to renounce her right to inheritance
C. Celia, because there is no evidence that Arthur has performed sufficient acts to constitute her ouster
D. Celia, because one cotenant cannot acquire title by adverse possession against another


Question 30

Johnson and Tenniel owned Brownacre as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Johnson executed a mortgage on Brownacre to Lowden in order to secure a loan. Subsequently, but before the indebtedness was paid to Lowden, Johnson died intestate with Stokes as her only heir at law. The jurisdiction at which Brownacre is located recognizes the title theory of mortgages.

In an appropriate action, the court should determine that title to Brownacre is vested

A. In Tenniel, with the entire interest subject to the mortgage
B. in Tenniel, free and clear of the mortgage
C. Half in Tenniel, free of the mortgage, and half in Stokes subject to the mortgage
D. Half in Tenniel and half in Stokes, with both subject to the mortgage


Question 31

Simmons and Boyd entered into a written contract for the sale and purchase of Wideacre. The contract provided that "Simmons agrees to convey a good and marketable title to Boyd sixty days from the date of this contract." The purchase price was stated as $60,000.

At the time set for closing Simmons tendered a deed in the form agreed to in the contract. Boyd's examination of the record prior to the date of closing had disclosed, however, that the owner of record was not Simmons, but Olson. Further investigation by Boyd revealed that, notwithstanding the state of the record, Simmons had been in what Boyd conceded is adverse possession for fifteen years. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is ten years. Boyd refuses to pay the purchase price or to take possession "because of the inability of Simmons to transfer a marketable title."

In an appropriate action by Simmons against Boyd for specific performance, Simmons will

A. Prevail, because he has obtained a "good and marketable title" by adverse possession
B. Prevail, because Simmons' action for specific performance is an action in rem even though Olson is not a party
C. Not prevail, because Boyd cannot be required to buy a lawsuit even if the probability is great that Boyd would prevail against Olson
D. Not prevail, because Simmons' failure to disclose his lack of record title constitutes fraud


Question 32

Santos agreed to sell and Perrine agreed to buy a described lot on which a single-family residence had been built. Under the contract, Santos agreed to convey marketable title subject only to conditions, covenants, and restrictions of record and all applicable zoning laws and ordinances. The lot was subject to a 10-foot side line setback originally set forth in the developer's duly recorded subdivision plot. The applicable zoning ordinance zones the property for single-family units and requires an 8.5-foot side line setback. Prior to closing, a survey of the property was made. It revealed that a portion of Santos' house was 8.4 feet from the side line.

Perrine refused to consummate the transaction on the ground that Santos' title is not marketable. In an appropriate action, Santos seeks specific performance. Who will prevail in such an action?

A. Santos, because any suit against Perrine concerning the setback would be frivolous
B. Santos, because the setback violation falls within the doctrine de minimis non curat lex
C. Perrine, because any variation, however small, amounts to a breach of contract
D. Perrine, because the fact that Perrine may be exposed to litigation is sufficient to make the title unmarketable


Question 33

Opus, the owner of Stoneacre, entered into a written agreement with Miner. Under this written agreement, which was acknowledged and duly recorded, Miner, for a five-year period, was given the privilege to enter Stoneacre to remove sand, gravel, and stone in whatever quantities Miner desired. Miner was to make monthly payments to Opus on the basis of the amount of sand, gravel, and stone removed during the previous month. Under the terms of the agreement, Miner's privilege was exclusive against all others except Opus, who reserved the right to use Stoneacre for any purpose whatsoever, including the removal of sand, gravel, and stone.

One year after the agreement was entered into, the state brought a condemnation action to take Stoneacre for a highway interchange. In the condemnation action, is Miner entitled to compensation?  

A. Yes, because he has a license, which is a property right protected by the due process clause
B. Yes, because he has a profit a prendre, which is a property right protected by the due process clause
C. No, because he has a license, and licenses are not property rights protected by the due process clause
D. No, because he has a profit a prendre, which is not a property right protected by the due process clause


Question 34

A ten-lot subdivision was approved by the proper governmental authority. The authority's action was pursuant to a map filed by Diaz, which included an undesignated parcel in addition to the ten numbered lots. The shape of the undesignated parcel is different and somewhat larger than any one of the numbered lots. Subdivision building restrictions were imposed on "all the lots shown on said map." Diaz contracts to sell the unnumbered lot, described by metes and bounds, to Butts.

Is title to the parcel marketable?

A. Yes, because the undesignated parcel is not a lot to which the subdivision building restrictions apply.
B. Yes, because the undesignated parcel is not part of the subdivision.
C. No, because the undesignated parcel has never been approved by the proper governmental authority.
D. No, because the map leaves it uncertain whether the unnumbered lot is subject to the building restrictions.


Question 35

Fernwood Realty Company developed a residential development, known as the Fernwood Development, which included single-family dwellings, town houses, and high-rise apartments for a total of 25,000 dwelling units. Included in the deed to each unit was a covenant under which the grantee and the grantee's "heirs and assigns" agreed to purchase electrical power only from a plant Fernwood promised to build and maintain within the development. Fernwood constructed the plant and the necessary power lines. The plant did not supply power outside the development. An appropriate and fair formula was used to determine price.

After constructing and selling 12,500 of the units, Fernwood sold its interest in the development to Gaint Realty Investors. Gaint operated the power plant and constructed and sold the remaining 12,500 units. Each conveyance from Gaint contained the same covenant relating to electrical power that Fernwood had included in the 12,500 conveyances it had made.

Page bought a dwelling unit from Olm, who had purchased it from Fernwood. Subsequently, Page, whose lot was along the boundary of the Fernwood development, ceased buying electrical power from Gaint and began purchasing power from General Power Company, which provided such service in the area surrounding the Fernwood development. Both Genera! Power and Gaint have governmental authorization to provide electrical services to the area. Gaint instituted an appropriate action against Page to enjoin her from obtaining electrical power from General Power. If judgment is for Page, it most likely will be because  

A. The covenant does not touch and concern the land
B. The mixture of types of residential units is viewed as preventing one common development scheme
C. The covenant is a restraint on alienation
D. There is no privity of estate between Page and Gaint


Questions 36-37 are based on the following fact situation

Orris had title to Brownacre in fee simple. Without Orris knowledge, Hull entered Brownacre in 1950 and constructed an earthen dam across a watercourse. The earthen dam trapped water that Hull used to water a herd of cattle he owned.

After twelve years of possession of Brownacre, Hull gave possession of Brownacre to Burns. At the same time, Hull also purported to transfer his cattle and all his interests in the dam and water to Bums by a document that was sufficient as a bill of sale to transfer personal property but was insufficient as a deed to transfer real property.

One year later, Burns entered into a lease with Orris to lease Brownacre for a period of five years. After the end of the five-year term of the lease, Bums remained on Brownacre for an additional three years and then left Brownacre. At that time Orris conveyed Brownacre by a quitclaim deed to Powell. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction in ten years.


Question 36

After Orris' conveyance to Powell, title to Brownacre was in

A. Hull
B. Orris
C. Burns
D. Powell


Question 37

After Orris' conveyance to Powell, title to the earthen dam was in

A. The person who then held title to Brownacre in fee simple
B. Bums as purchaser of the dam under the bill of sale
C. The person who then owned the water rights as an incident thereto
D. Hull as the builder of the dam





Question 1

The following facts concern a tract of land in a state that follows general United States law. Each instrument is in proper form, recorded, marital property rights were waived when necessary, and each person named was adult and competent at the time of the named transaction.

1. In 1940 Oleg, the owner, conveyed his interest in fee simple "to my brothers Bob and Bill, their heirs and assigns as joint tenants with right of survivorship."
2. In 1950 Bob died, devising his interest to his only child, "Charles, for life, and then to Charles's son, Sam, for life, and then to Sam's children, their heirs and assigns."
3. In 1970 Bill died, devising his interest "to my friend, Frank, his heirs and assigns."
4. In 1972 Frank conveyed his quitclaim deed "to Paul, his heirs and assigns whatever right, title and interest I own."

Paul has never married. Paul has contracted to convey marketable record title in the land to Patrick. Can Paul do so?

A. Yes, without joinder of any other person in the conveyance.
B. Yes, if Charles, Sam, and Sam's only child (Gene, age 25) will join in the conveyance.
C. No, regardless of who joins in the conveyance, because Sam may have additional children whose interests cannot be defeated.
D. No, regardless of who joins in the conveyance, because a title acquired by quitclaim deed is impliedly unmerchantable.  


Question 2

Odum owned Brightacre (a tract of land) in fee simple. He conveyed it "to Pike, his heirs and assigns; but if Parley shall be living thirty years from the date of this deed, then to Parley, his heirs and assigns." The limitation "to Parley, his heirs and assigns" is

A. Valid, because Parley's interest is a reversion
B. Valid, because the interest will vest, if at all, within a life in being
C. Valid, because Parley's interest is vested subject to divestment
D. Invalid  


Question 3

Homer conveyed his home to his wife, Wanda, for life, remainder to his daughter, Dixie. There was a $20,000 mortgage on the home, requiring monthly payment covering interest to date plus a portion of the principal. Which of the following statements about the monthly payment is correct?

A. Wanda must pay the full monthly payment.
B. Wanda must pay a portion of the monthly payment based on an apportionment of the value between Wanda's life estate and Dixie's remainder.
C. Wanda must pay the portion of the monthly payment, which represents interest.
D. Dixie must pay the full monthly payment.


Questions 4-5 are based on the following fact situation

Trease owned Hilltop in fee simple. By his will, he devised as follows: "Hilltop to such of my grandchildren who shall reach the age of 21; and by this provision I intend to include all grandchildren whenever born." At the time of his death, Trease had three children and two grandchildren.


Question 4

Courts hold such a devise valid under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. What is the best explanation of that determination?

A. All of Trease's children would be measuring lives.
B. The rule of convenience closes the class of beneficiaries when any grandchild reaches the age of 21.
C. There is a presumption that Trease intended to include only those grandchildren born prior to his death.
D. There is a subsidiary rule of construction that dispositive instruments are to be interpreted so as to uphold interests rather than to invalidate them under the Rule Against Perpetuities.


Question 5

Which of the following additions to or changes in the facts of the preceding question would produce a violation of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities?

A. A posthumous child was born to Trease.
B. Trease's will expressed the intention to include all afterborn grandchildren in the gift.
C. The instrument was an inter vivos conveyance rather than a will.
D. Trease had no grandchildren living at the time of his death.


Question 6

Testator devised his farm "to my son, Selden, for life, then to Selden's children and their heirs and assigns." Selden, a widower, had two unmarried adult children. In appropriate action to construe the will, the court will determine that the remainder to children is

A. Indefeasibly vested
B. Contingent
C. Vested subject to partial defeasance
D. Vested subject to complete defeasance


Questions 7-8 are based on the following fact situation

In 1945 Owen, owner of both Blackacre and Whiteacre, executed and delivered two separate deeds by which he conveyed the two tracts of land as follows: Blackacre was conveyed "To Alpha and his heirs as long as it is used exclusively for residential purposes, but if it is ever used for other than residential purposes, to the American Red Cross." Whiteacre was conveyed "To Beta and her heirs as long as it is used exclusively for residential purposes, but if it is used for other than residential purposes prior to 1965, then to the Salvation Army." In 1950 Owen died leaving a valid will by which he devised all his real estate to his brother, Bill. The will had no residuary clause. Owen was survived by Bill and by Owen's daughter, Delia who was Owen's sole heir.

For the purpose of this set of questions, it may be assumed that the common law Rule Against Perpetuities applies in the state where the land is located and that the state also has a statute providing that, "All future estates and interests are alienable, descendible, and devisable in the same manner as possessory estates and interests."


Question 7

In 1955, Alpha and Delia entered into a contract with John whereby Alpha and Delia contracted to sell Blackacre to John in fee simple. After examining title, John refused to perform on the ground that Alpha and Delia could not give good title. Alpha and Delia joined in an action against John for specific performance. Prayer for specific performance will be 

A. Granted, because Alpha and Delia together own a fee simple absolute in Blackacre
B. Granted, because Alpha alone owns the entire fee simple in Blackacre
C. Denied, because Bill has a valid interest in Blackacre
D. Denied, because the American Red Cross has a valid interest in Blackacre


Question 8

In 1946, the interest of the American Red Cross in Blackacre could best be described as a

A. Valid contingent remainder
B. Void executory interest
C. Valid executory interest
D. Void contingent remainder


Question 9

Morgan conveyed Greenacre, her one-family residence, to "Perez for life, remainder to Rowan, her heirs and assigns, subject, however, to First Bank's mortgage thereon." There was an unpaid balance on the mortgage of $10,000, which is payable in $1,000 annual installments plus interest at 6 percent on the unpaid balance, with the next payment due on July 1. Perez is now occupying Greenacre. The reasonable rental value of the property exceeds the sum necessary to meet all current charges. There is no applicable statute.

Under the rules governing contributions between life tenants and remaindermen, how should the burden for payment be allocated?

A. Rowan must pay the principal payment, but Perez must pay the interest to First Bank.
B. Rowan must pay both the principal and the interest payments to First Bank.
C. Perez must pay both the principal and interest payments to First Bank.
D. Perez must pay the principal payment, but Rowan must pay the interest to First Bank.


Question 10

Anders conveyed her only parcel of land to Burton by a duly executed and delivered warranty deed, which provided: To have and to hold the described tract of land in fee simple, subject to the understanding that within one year from the date of the instrument said grantee shall construct and thereafter maintain and operate on said premises a public health center.

The grantee, Burton, constructed a public health center on the tract within the time specified and operated it for five years. At the end of this period, Burton converted the structure into a senior citizens' recreational facility. It is conceded by all parties in interest that a senior citizens' recreational facility is not a public health center.

In an appropriate action, Anders seeks a declaration that the change in the use of the facility has caused the land and structure to revert to her. In this action, Anders should  

A. Win, because the language of the deed created a determinable fee, which leaves a possibility of reverter in the grantor
B. Win, because the language of the deed created a fee subject to a condition subsequent, which leaves a right of entry or power of termination in the grantor
C. Lose, because the language of the deed created only a contractual obligation and did not provide for retention of property interest by the grantor


Question 11

In 1965, Hubert Green executed his will which in pertinent part provided, "I hereby give, devise, and bequeath Greenvale to my surviving widow for life, remainder to such of my children as shall live to attain the age of 30 years, but if any child dies under the age of 30 years survived by a child or children, such child or children shall take and receive the share which his, her, or their parent would have received had such parent lived to attain the age of 30 years."

At the date of writing his will, Green was married to Susan, and they had two children, Allan and Beth. Susan died in 1970 and Hubert married Waverly in 1972. At his death in 1980, Green was survived by his wife Waverly, and three children, Allan, Beth and Carter. Carter, who was born in 1974, was his child by Waverly.

In a jurisdiction which recognizes the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities unmodified by statute, the result of the application of the rule is that the

A. Remainder to the children and to the grandchildren is void because Green could have subsequently married a person who was unborn at the time Green executed his will
B. Remainder to the children is valid, but the substitutionary gift to the grandchildren is void because Green could have subsequently married a person who was unborn at the time Green executed his will
C. Gift in remainder to Allan and Both or their children is valid, but the gift to Carter or his children is void
D. Remainder to the children and the substitutionary gift to the grandchildren are valid


Question 12

Martinez, a widower, owns in fee simple a ranch, Ranchacre. Martinez has one child, Enrique, who is married. Enrique has one child, Ana Maria, who is also married but has no children. In an effort to dispose of Ranchacre to his descendants and to honor a request by Ana Maria that she be skipped in any disposition, Martinez conveys Ranchacre to his son, Enrique, for life with the remainder to Ana Maria's children in fee simple.

What interest, if any, is created in favor of Ana Maria's unborn children at the time of the conveyance?

A. A contingent remainder
B. A vested remainder subject to divestment
C. A springing use
D. None


Question 13

Fora valuable consideration, Amato, the owner of Riveracre, signed and gave to Barton a duly executed instrument that provided as follows: "The grantor may or may not sell Riveracre during her lifetime, but at her death, or if she earlier decides to sell, the property will be offered to Barton at $500 per acre. Barton shall exercise this right, if at all, within sixty days of receipt of said offer to sell." Barton recorded the instrument. The instrument was not valid as a will.

Is Barton's right under the instrument valid?

A. Yes, because the instrument is recorded.
B. Yes, because Barton's right to purchase will vest or fail within the period prescribed by the Rule Against Perpetuities.
C. No, because Barton's right to purchase is a restraint on the owner's power to make a testamentary disposition.
D. No, because Barton's right to purchase is an unreasonable restraint on alienation.


Question 14

Andres conveyed Applewood Farm "to Bogatz, her heirs and assigns, so long as the premises are used for residential and farm purposes, then to Cohen and his heirs." The common law Rule Against Perpetuities, unmodified by statute, is part of the law of the jurisdiction in which Applewood Farm Is located. As a consequence of the conveyance, Cohen's interest in Applewood Farm is

A. Nothing
B. A valid executory interest
C. A possibility of reverter
D. A right of entry for condition broken


Question 15

Ortega owned Blackacre in fee simple and by his will specifically devised Blackacre as follows: "To my daughter, Eugenia, her heirs and assigns, but if Eugenia dies survived by a husband and a child or children, then to Eugenia's husband during his lifetime with remainder to Eugenia's children, their heirs and assigns. Specifically provided, however, that if Eugenia dies survived by a husband and no child, Blackacre is specifically devised to my nephew, Luis, his heirs and assigns."

While Ortega's will was in probate, Luis quitclaimed all interest in Blackacre to Eugenia's husband, Jose. Three years later, Eugenia died, survived by Jose but no children. Eugenia left a will devising her interest in Blackacre to Jose. The only applicable statute provides that any interest in land is freely alienable.

Luis instituted an appropriate action against Jose to establish title to Blackacre. Judgment should be for

A. Luis, because his quitclaim deed did not transfer his after acquired title
B. Luis, because Jose took nothing under Ortega's will
C. Jose, because Luis had effectively conveyed his interest in Blackacre
D. Jose, because the doctrine of after-acquired title applies to a devise by will

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